State Bank of Lehi v. Ralph O. Woolsey and Sylvia W. Woolsey : Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
State Bank of Lehi v. Ralph O. Woolsey and Sylvia
W. Woolsey : Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Heber Grant Ivins;
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
S. Rex Lewis; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, No. 14719 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/457
STATE BANK OF LEHI, 
a Utah corporation, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, Case No. 14, 719 
vs. 
RALPH O. WOOLSEY and 
SYLVIA W. WOOLSEY, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAI'NTIFF-IESPOlllDBllT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT BY Tiii FOIJR'lll JUDICl& 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE·fll 11m 
HONORABLE J. ltoBEltT BULLOCIC., Jm)G'I 
S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
JAN 13 19n. 
'I 
I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE BANK OF LEHI, 
a Utah corporation, 
VS. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
RALPH 0. WOOLSEY and 
SYLVIA W. WOOLSEY, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 14,719 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT BY THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
75 North Center 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT- ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN · GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
.,.':.-·,,,, .... , 
POINT II 
PAG& 
1 
'l 
·1 
1 
'2 
.. 11,. 
3 
. •'·' 
. ro: , o\ "9'. ; fl• : "'· 1 , •• , •,•, 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THERE WAS NO EXTENSION OF THE DUE DATE 
OF THE $115,000 NOTE . ' 
POINT III • : • ~-.. , 1 r r 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
ALL THREE- NOTES TC>" BE- DUE . AND' OWING IN 
THAT THE APPELLANTS DID NOT ESTABLISH 
LACK OF GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF.THE 
RESPONDENT IN DECLARING THE NOTES DUE 
• • • • I r' • : '~ :~ i_J 
POINT IV 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS OF THE 
APPELANTS THE COURT DID NOT STRIKE 
TESTIMONY FROM 'i'HE RECORD CONCERNING-THE 
SECURITY AGREEMENT ASSIGNING MRS. WOOLSEY'S 
INTEREST IN PROPERTY IN PROVO 
CONCLUSION 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
'•t'"' 
8 
13 
14 
147 A.L.R. 1109.............................................. 10 
SS Am. Jur 2d, Mortgages, §387............................... 12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SS Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, §SSS 
............................... 10 
SS Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, §S88 .•.............................. 4 
7S Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §410 ................................... . 5 
1 Williston on Contracts, §122 ................................ . 7 
CASES CITED 
Clark v. Paddock, 24 Idaho 142, 132 P. 79S (1913) .............. 12 
Damet v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 72 Okla. 122, 179 P. 760 (1919) .. 12 
Haws v. Detroit F & M Ins. Co., 109 Mich. 324, 67 N.W. 329 .•... 12 
Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P. 2d 2SO (19S8) .......... 4 
Jacobson v. McClanahan, 43 Wash. 2d 7Sl, 264 P. 2d 2S3 (19S3) .• 12 
Julien v. Model Bldg. & Invest. Assoc., 116 Wis. 79, 
92 N.W. S61 (1902) .•......•...... 12 
Keefer v. Valentine, 199 Iowa 1337, 203 N.W. 787 (192S) ........ 7 
Metropolitan State Bank v. Wright, 72 Colo. 106, 
209 P. 804 (1922) ................ 1!> 
National Life Ins. Co. v. Butler, 61 Neb. 449, 8S N.W.437 •.... 12 
Norback v. Board of Directors of Church Extension Soc., 
84 Utah S06, 37 P. 2d 339 (1934). 3, 4 
Petty v. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P. 2d S68 (1942)............. 4 
Shaw v. Bill, 9S U.S. 10, 24 L. Ed. 333 (1877) ................. 10 
Swearingen v. Lahner 93 Iowa l47, 6l N.W. 43l (1894) ....•..... 12 
Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P. 2d 126 
(1966) ....... 3,~ 
Thomas v. Foulger, 71 Utah 274, 264 P. 97S (1928) .............. 12 
Tolbert v. Mcswain, 137 S.W. 2d lOSl (Tex. Civil App. 1939) ... . 
Tsesmelis v. Sinton State Bank, S3 S.W. 2d 461, 8S A.L.R. 
319 (Tex. 1932).................. 6 
Verdi v. Helper State Bank, S7 Utah S64, 196 P. 22S (1921) ..... 5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
s. D. Walker, Inc. v. Brigantine Beach Hotel Corp. 
44 N.J. Super 193, 129 A. 2d 758 (1957)..... 12 
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P. 2d 1145 (Utah 1976) 
545 P. 2d 1149 ..........•..••...••...••..... 
STATUTES CITED 
9, 10, 
11, 12 
Utah Code Annotated, § 70A-l-208................................. 9 
' I 
I I 
I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a foreclosure action upon both real and personal 
property, the property consisting of an operating mink ranch located 
near Lehi, Utah, and an assignment of a Real Estate Contract upon the 
home of the defendant, Sylvia W. Woolsey. The trial court properly 
held that the three promissory notes totaling some $160,000.00 were 
due and owing and ordered the appointment of a receiver in view of 
evidence that the mink were being neglected and that approximately 
$25,000.00 in mink skins had been stolen. The trial court ordered the 
sale of the security and since the Appellants did not post a Superdeseas 
Bond, the property has been sold with a substantial deficiency resulting. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court awarded judgment to the Respondent foreclosing 
the security interests with the subsequent sale resulting pursuant to 
Foreclosure Decree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to sustain the trial court's judgment as 
entered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent, State Bank of Lehi, had financed a mink oper-
ation near Lehi, Utah, for several years during which time the loan had 
In 1975 the bank, once again, refinanced the 
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Appellants with the understanding that additional financing would not 
be forthcoming and that they must live within their outlined budget, 
and required additional security consisting of the assignment of a 
Real Estate Contract on Mrs. Woolsey's home in Provo, Utah. 
In December of 1975, the Appellants had been advanced all of 
the money pursuant to the three notes in question, had incurred an 
overdraft of approximately $1,000.00, and at approximately the same 
time advised the bank that some 981 mink pelts had been stolen from his 
ranch. In addition, bank authorities observed the mink operation being' 
I 
neglected and, after consulting with counsel, the board of directors 
determined that the Appellants could not obtain outside financing, and 
that immediate action was necessary to preserve their collateral. 
On January 2, 1976, a receiver was appointed who continued to 
operate the ranch until the sale of the security was conducted on the 
13th day of October, 1976, resulting in a sizeable deficiency. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent argued that the trial court acted within its 
discretion in trying this matter without a jury in view of such fore-
closure action being an equitable suit and, further, that the court 
entertained all testimony regarding the documents in question but, 
further, that no fraud was involved and, therefor, struck testimony 
violating the parole evidence rule. Such action upon the part of the 
trial court was well within its discretion and did not constitute 
error. Respondent believes that the record shows overwhelming evidence 
to support the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of Foreclosure. 
-2-
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL. 
This action was for the purpose of foreclosing upon three 
(3) promissory notes secured by assignments of contract (Exhibits 12 
and 13), and security agreement (Exhibit 15). Originally the Appellants 
had requested a jury trial and, subsequent thereto, the Respondent filed 
a motion to strike which was granted by Judge Bullock after the filing 
of legal memoranda and oral argmnent. The Order striking the jury stated: 
"This Order is based upon the finding by this Court that the 
issues to be decided are largely equitable and arise from 
an interpretation of written contracts and therefore the 
defendants are not entifled to a jury trial." 
In Norback v. Board of Directors of Church Extension Soc., 
84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339 P. 345 (1934), this Court stated: 
"If the issues are legal or the major issue legal, either 
party is entiled upon proper demand to a jury trial; but if 
the issues are equitable or the major issues to be resolved 
by an application of equity, the legal issues being merely 
subsidiary, the action should be regarded as equitable and 
the rules of equity apply." 
The basic question, therefore, is whether the major issues are 
legal or equitable. This court has offered some guidance in the res-
olution of this question in the case of Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 
18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P. 2d 126 P. 128-129 (1966), wherein the court 
stated: 
"In circtunstances where doubt exists as to whether the cause 
should be regarded as one in equity, or one in law wherein 
the party can insist on a jury as a matter of right, the 
trial court should have some latitude of discretion. In 
making that determination it is not bound by the ostensible 
form of the action, nor by the particular wording of the 
pleadings. It may examine into the nature of the rights 
asserted and the remedies sought in the light of the facts 
of the case to ascertain which predominates; and from that 
-3-
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detennination make the appropriate order as to a jury 0 
. . 1 r 
non- Jury tria . The fact that the division of court hea . 
the pre-trial indicates that the case is set for a trialrmg 
by jury is entitled to some consideration and should not 
be countennanded without good reason. Nevertheless it is 
the prerogative of the judge who actually tries the case 
to make the detennination. Unless it is shown that the 
ruling was patently in error or an abuse of discretion 
this court will not interfere •with the ruling thereon.:, 
The Appellants have attempted to show that the major issues 
were legal rather than equitable since the trial court's Findings of 
Fact numerically outnumbered the Conclusions of Law. This is clearly 
insufficient to show a patent abuse of discretion as required by the 
Sweeny case, supra. It is true that once a jury trial is found to be 
proper, issues of fact are for the jury. But the existence of issues 
of fact does not warrant a conclusion that the Appellants therefore 
had a right to a jury trial. Before a trial may be had to a jury there 
must be some legal issue. In Petty v. Cl.ark, 102 Utah, 129 P 2d 568 
(1942), a jury was allowed to decide the one legal issue of whether 
a clause was contained in the instrument at the time it was delivered. 
In Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P. 2d 2SO (19S8), this court 
reaffirmed its view in Norback, supra, that if there are subsidiary 
legal issues in an equitable action the rules of equity would apply. 
This would appear to restrict somewhat the allowance in Petty v · Clark, 
supra, of the jury to try one legal issue when the major issues were 
equitable. 
According to SS Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages §S88, 
"Since a foreclosure suit is a suit- in eQuity, there is in 
most jurisdictions no right to a jury trial, unless granted 
by constitutional or statutory provision, even though a 
d f . . 'ning after personal judgment or decree for any e iciency remai 
application of the proceeds is sought." 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Even in cases in which jury trial is allowed the legal effect 
to written instrwnents is to be determined by the court. In the case of 
Verdi v. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 564, 196 P. 225 P. 228 (1921), this 
court stated: 
"It is manifest that the court erred in submitting pro-
position "a" to a jury. In doing that the court required 
the jury to do what clearly the law requires of the court. 
The legal effect of written instrwnents is necessarily a 
question of law, and hence is one that must be determined 
by the court. To that rule there is no exception, not 
even in cases where the facts respecting the terms of the 
written instrwnerits are in dispute, which arise sometimes 
where the written instrwnents have been lost. In the latter 
class of cases the jury may find what the terms of the 
instrwnents were, but the court must, nevertheless,_determine 
the legal effect of the instrwnents when the terms are 
found and determined." 
In addition, the question of whether the writing is completely 
integrated is also for the court. In 75 Am. Jur.2d Trial §410, it is 
stated that: 
"The question whether a writing is, upon its face, a 
complete expression of the agreement of the parties is 
one for the court, and subject to qualifications where 
the contract is uncertain and ambiguous, particularly 
where extrinsic evidence has been introduced of sur-
rounding facts and circwnstances bearing upon intention 
of the parties, the general rule is that where a contract 
has been reduced to writing, its interpretation, con-
struction, or legal effect is for the court and not for 
the jury. This is true whether the written agreement 
is expressed in one docwnent or in several, provided the 
writings express the complete agreement of the parties 
and the language used is clear, plain, certain, undisputed, 
unambiguous, unequivocal, and not subject to conflicting 
inferences, or where the only doubt as to its meaning 
arises from the language the parties used, and not from 
extrinsic matters. In other words, where a clear meaning 
can be ascertained without resort to extrinsic facts, the 
interpretation of a writing is for the court This rule is 
as applicable to c0mmercial correspondence as to a formal 
written contract. Thus, the scope and effect of a contract 
which depends wholly upon written correspondence, and not 
upon extrinsic circwnstances, are to be determined by the 
court. Whether terms of art were used in their ordinary 
meaning or not, in a contract between men familiar with 
-5-
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the business to which the tenns relate, cannot 
be left to the jury, although they may detennine the 
meaning of the terms in that business. The court 
cannot devolve its duty of c~nstruing written 
instruments upon the jury merely because its 
perfonnance involves possible difficulty." 
The major issues in the case at bar were equitable and, 
therefore those issues, as well as subsidiary legal issues, were 
rightfully tried without a jury. Since the major issues revolved 
around the effect to be given the tenns of a written contract, there 
would be little for a jury to decide, even if it were an action at law. 
Since the foreclosure is a suit in equity there is no jury allowed no 
matter how many issues of fact there are. Since the Appellants have 
failed to show that the trial court's Order granting Respondent's 
motion to strike demand for jury trial was a patent error or abuse of 
discretion, such Order should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
EXTENSION OF THE DUE DATE OF THE $115,000 NOTE. 
It is generally held that an agreement to extend a due date 
of a note must possess all of the traditional requirements of any con· 
tract. In the landmark case in this area, Tsesmelis v. Sinton State 
Bank, 53 S.W. 2d 461 P. 462, 85 A.L.R 319 (Tex. 1932), the court state!: 
"To support a ·contention that the payment of a 
negotiable instrument has been extended, there must 
exist all the elements essential to the execution of 
a contract and the agreement for the extension must 
be for a d~finite time and mutually bind the parties, 
payor and payee, the one to forbear suit during the 
time of extension, and the other his right to pay the 
debt before the end of that time." 
In order for the consideration to be sufficient, the creditor 
-6-
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must secure, by reason of the extension, something which he could not 
otherwise demand. In the case at bar, since theoriginal note of 
$115,000.00 was secured by all present and all future animals, no 
additional benefit was given to the creditor by way of the July 3, 1975 
Security Agreement. Any collateral added by the July 3, 1975 Security 
Agreement was to secure the loan of an additional $50,000.00 to the 
Appellants. A predominant authority on contracts offered the following 
in regard to the sufficiency of consideration for an extension of a 
due date of a promissory note: 
"If, however, the debtor neither promises to refrain 
from paying the debt until a fixed day in the future, nor 
to pay interest until that time whether the debt is paid 
or not, there is no consideration to support the creditor's 
promise to extend the time of payment." 1 Williston on 
Contracts §122. 
In addition to the lack of consideration> ·the alleged extension 
agreement in the case at bar lacked mutuality. In the case of Keefer 
v. Valentine,199 Iowa.1337, 203 N.W. 787 (1925), there was not an 
extension of the due date since the debtor "still had a right to pay 
the note at any time." Also, in Tolbert v.· McSwain,137 S.W. 2d 1051 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939), the court said, "During' the period of the exten-
sion provided for the maker cannot have the right to make· payment." 
Since there was no consideration for the alleged extension 
agreement, and since there was no showing by the Appellants that he 
had promised not to pay the note.during the period of the alleged 
extension, there was, as a matter of law, no agreement for·the extension 
of the due date on the $115,000.00 note; The trial court was therefore 
right in finding that the $115,000.00 note was in default at the time 
this suit was instituted. 
-7-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING ALL THREE NOTES 
TO BE DUE AND OWING IN THAT THE APPELLANTS DID NOT ESTABLISH LACK 
OF GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENT IN DECLARING THE NOTES 
DUE. 
Paragraph 8 of the Security Agreement dated July 3, 1975, 
states the grounds upon which the notes may be declared to be in 
default. 
Subparagraph (1) provides as a ground for declaration of 
default that, "Debtor fails to pay any of the Obligations when due." 
Since the $115,000.00 note was overdue as of February 20, 1975, and 
since there was no extension of the due date, as amply shown in the 
previous Point, it is clear that the $115,000.00 note was due and owing 
on January 2, 1976, the date the other two notes were declared due and 
owing. 
Subparagraph (4) allows for a declaration of default when 
the, "Debtor becomes insolvent or unable to pay debts as they mature." 
It was admitted on page 16 of the Appellant's brief that the Appellants 
were insolvent on January 2, 1976. In addition, Calvin H. Swenson 
testified, on page 79 of his deposition, that there had been an over· 
draft of over $1,000.00 on an overdue feed bill. On page 80 of his 
deposition, Mr. Swenson also testified that the bank had to pay feed 
and supply bills totalling approximately $10,000.00 in order to keep 
the mink from becoming worthless and unmarketable. 
The third ground upon which the Respondent relied in declarin! 
the notes to be in default was under Subparagraph (10) which states that 
the debtor shall be in default if "any collateral is lost, stolen or 
materially damaged. Appellants admitted that some 968 mink pelts were 
-8-
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late December of 1975, shortly before the bank declared the 
notes due on January 2, 1976. Subparagraph (10).was not conditional 
upon a lack of insurance, but stated that any theft or loss would 
cause the notes to be in default. The Appellants should not now be 
heard to object to this ground for default since he voluntarily signed 
the Security Agreement. 
The fourth ground for default is Subparagraph (11) which states 
that the debtor shall be in default if_ the "Bank shall deem itself in-
secure for any reason whatsoever.'.' This Subparagraph is suJ?ject to 
Section 70A-l-208, Utah Code_ Annotated, which provides: 
"A term providing that one,_party or hi.s successor in " 
interest may accelerate payment or performance or 
require collateral or additional collateral 'at will'.or 
'when he deems himself insecure' or in words of similar 
import shall be construed to mean that he shall have 
power to do so only. if he in g~od falth believes· that the 
prospect of payment or perform~nce. is impaired. 1'ae 
burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party 
against whom the power has been exercised." 
This Court recently construed this statute in the case o.f 
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P. 2d 1145 (Utah 1976), cited by Appellants, 
but this case is readily distinguishable. Respondent was clearly justi-
fied in believing that the prospect of payment was impaired. Following 
is a list of various admitted actions of.the Appellants.which show the 
Respondent acted in good faith: 
1 .. The threat of suicide on the part of Appellant, Ralph 0. 
Woolsey. (See Testimony of Ralph 0. Woolsey, R. 358, lines 1-6; and 
Testimony of Calvin H. Swenson, R. 300, lines 3-4 and R. 308, lines 1-7); 
2. Judgments outstanding against Appellants (See Testi-
mony of Calvin H. Swenson, R. 319, lines 10-22); 
-9-
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3. The neglect of the animals (See Testimony of Calvin H. 
Swenson, R. 301, lines 1-2, and Testimony of Berl Peterson, R. 486, 
lines 2-8); 
4. The divorces of Appellant, Ralph O. Woolsey, and other 
marital problems. (See Testimony of Ralph O. Woolsey, R. 3S8, 
lines 1-2 and R. 407, lines 23-26); and 
S. Appellant Ralph O •. Woolsey' s conviction for drunk driving 
during the month preceding the institution of this suit. (See Testimony 
of Ralph 0. Woolsey, R. 407, line 27 through R. 409, line 2). 
The foregoing conditions were clearly sufficient to justify 
the Respondent,' thr~mgh its, president Calvin H. ··Swenson, in having 
a good faith belief that the prospect of payment was impaired. The 
Appellants in.an attempt to fulfill their burden of showing a lack of 
good faith, have pointed to. a number of Respondent• s actions which they 
consider inequitable. The first of these is that the Respondent made 
no demand for payment. It is stated in SS Am. Jur 2d, Mortgages §555: 
"The general rule, in the absence of a statute or 
mortgage stipulation .so providing, is that it .is not 
essential that a demand for 'payment be made before 
commencement of an action for foreclosure of a mortgage. 
Clearly, where a mortgagor is insolvent, and has no 
funds at the place of payment, demand there, prior to 
foreclosure, is unnecessary." 
That treatise cites Shaw v. Bill, 95 U.S. 10, 24 L. Ed. 333 
(1877); Metropolitan State Bank v. Wright, 72 Colo. 106, 209 P. 804 (19W 
and 147 A.L.R. 1109 as support for the preceding statements. In the caf. 
of Williamson v. Wanlass, supra, the attorney for the plaintiffs had 
stated that the plaintiffs might accelerate if they became aggravated. 
This Court then stated: 
-10-
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"The question arises as to how the defendants would know 
that condition came about unless someone so advised them. 
It is generally true that if there is a condition to be 
fulfilled, of which one party would be aware and the 
other would not, it is regarded as fair and proper that 
the one who knows should be obliged to notify the other 
party affected thereby, and give him a reasonable' 
opportunity to react thereto. " 
This stands for the proposition that notice should be given 
of conditions such as aggravation prior to the acceleration of the notes. 
It does not stand for the proposition that a party be obligated to tell 
the other party that it is in default when the party already knows that 
it is in default. It is clear that the Respondent acted properly in 
' .. 
accelerating without making a demand for payment upon the Appellant. 
In light of the Respondent's knowledge of Appellant's insolvency and 
inability to obtain outside financing, such demand would be useless. 
At any rate, the Respondent's failure to make demand of the Appellant 
is not a showing that the Respondent lacked a good faith belief that 
the prospect of payment had been impaired. Indeed, Appellant makes no 
effort to show that the prospect of payment was even .existent, other 
than Appellant's friendship with someone who might· have loaned Appellant 
some money in the future. It remains that at the time -the suit;.was 
instituted the prospect of payment was at best dismal. In the Williamson 
case, supra, this Court found a lack of good faith~elief that the 
prospect of payment was impaired. The Court there stated: 
"There was no such showing made in this case. From 
the fact that the plaintiffs had a second mortgage 
on this extensive property, there can be little. 
doubt that the note would be paid, principal and 
interest." 
The case at bar can be distinguished on the facts from the 
Williamson case. In Williamson, the defendants had been consistently 
late with payments, but payments were always made and accepted. Here 
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the debt had consistently grown larger with only occasional pay-
ments on the principal. In Williamson, the plaintiffs had no good 
reason to suspect that payments were not forthcoming. In the case at 
bar, the prospect of payment was in serious doubt. 
The Appellant has also stated that it was a lack of good 
faith for Respondent to accelerate the debt without giving notice of 
the acceleration to the Appellant. However, many cases have held tMt i 
notice of acceleration is not required in the absence of a specific 
I 
provision therefor in the mortgage. See S. D. Walker, Inc. v. Brigal!llii 
Beach Hotel Corp., 44 N.J. Suuer. 193, 129 A. 2d 758 (1957); ~.I 
Foulger, 71 Utah 274, 264 P. 975 (1928); Jacobson v. McClanahan, 
43 Wash. 2d 751, 264 P. 2d 253 (1953); and Julien v. Model Bldg. Loan 
& Invest. Asso., 116 Wis. 79. 92 N.W. 561 (1902). In addition, accord~ 
to 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §387, 
"It is generally held that the institution of a suit 
to foreclose a mortgage is notice of the most un-
equivocal character that the mortgagee wishes to 
avail himself of his option for acceleration." 
The following cases are cited as authority for this view: 
I 
I 
Clark v. Paddock, 24 Idaho 142, 132 P. 795 (1913) ;· Swearingen v. Lahner,I 
93 Iowa 147, 61 N.W. 431 (1894); S. D. Walker, Inc. v. Brigantine Beacll 
Hotel Corp., suura; Hawes v. Detroit 'F & M Ins. Co., 109 Mich. 324. 
67 N.W. 329 (1896)-; National Life Ins. Co. v. Butler,61 Neb. 449, 85li 
437 (1901); and Damet v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 72 Okla. 122, 179 P. 7601 
Since- the -notes wer..e -in -Oefaul.t: .under- four different Subpar11, 
of Paragraph 8 of the Security Agreement, and since the Appellants ha~ 
not fulfilled their burden of showing any lack of good faith in declar·i 
ing the notes due, the decision of the trial court concerning these 
issues should be upheld. 
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POINT IV 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS THE COURT 
DID NOT STRIKE TESTIMONY FROM THE RECORD CONCERNING THE SECURITY 
AGREEMENT ASSIGNING MRS. WOOLSY'S INTEREST IN PROPERTY IN PROVO. 
That contrary to the assertions of the Appellants the 
Respondent can find nothing in the record indicating that the court 
did not consider all evidence surrounding the assignment of Mrs. 
Woolsey's interest in her residence in Provo, Utah. 
On P 209 R. 461 is the only reference to excluding such 
testimony. This shows as follows: 
MR. IVINS: "Your Honor, for the record, I would like to 
interpose an objection to this testimony on the grounds that Mrs. 
Woolsey is attempting to alter the terms of this written document by 
parol evidence." 
THE COURT: "Okay, I'm going to take that motion under advise-
ment. I'll let you proceed, and it will be considered in the nature of 
a proffer of proof, that at some time I'll rule whether or not that is 
the case. Go ahead." 
Following this exchange with the court all testimony relating 
to the obtaining of Mrs. Wool~ey's security was introduced and the court 
did not, at any time, indicate that any testimony had been stricken and 
the court found that there was no evidence to justify a finding of fraud 
in obtaining such collateral. 
This court has held on many occasions that the findings of the 
lower court on factual matters will not be overruled unless there is a 
clear abuse of discretion. In the instant case the Respondent knows 
of no testimony which was excluded and not considered in the findings 
of the lower court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellants have failed to prove that the trial judge 
abused his discretion in striking Appellant's Demand for Jury 
Trial. The major issues of the trial were equitable; legal issues, 
if any, were clearly subsidiary to the predominant equitable issues, 
The trial judge was correct in striking the Appellant's Demand for 
Jury Trial since no jury is required to try equitable issues. 
The Appellants failed to prove the existence of any oral 
agreement to extend the due date on the $115,000.00 note and the 
Respondent properly accelerated the maturity date on the $45,000.00 
and the $5,000.00 notes since the Appellants were in default under 
the provisions of four separate Subparagraphs of Paragraph 8 of the 
Security Agreement dated July 3, 1975. The actions constituting 
default are detailed on pages 9-10. The Appellants failed to show, 
as was their burden, lack of good faith on the part of Respondent that 
their prospects of payment had been impaired. In fact, the weight of 
the evidence clearly shows that the Respondent acted in good faith ana 
the subsequent sale of collateral with a resulting substantial 
deficiency conclusively shows the need for taking immediate action to 
minimize their losses. 
The Respondent respectfully urges the Appellate Court to 
affirm the trial court's Judgment in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, I~ 
Heber Grant Ivins 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to S. Rex Lewis 
for Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants, 
120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah 84601, the 13th day of January, 1976. 
Secretary 
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